EMNACE vs. CA

EMNACE vs. CA

November 23, 2001

FACTS:        

Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them. 

Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership.  Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner.

HELD:

No.  The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.  Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

RIOFERIO vs. CA

RIOFERIO vs. CA

January 13, 2004

FACTS:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.

      Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.

      Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator.

HELD:          

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

 

 Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.

DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED

DELA MERCED  vs. DELA MERCED

February 25, 1999

FACTS:  

Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs.

On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.

  

ISSUE:

WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evarista’s estate.

HELD:

 No.  Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista.

VITUG vs. CA

VITUG  vs. CA

183 SCRA 755

FACTS:  

Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

ISSUES:

             WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

 WON it is valid.

RULING:

                Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property.  The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other.  Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account. 

MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN

MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN

June 5, 2002

FACTS: 

Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in favor of his brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donor’s death. Conchita died. Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities of a will.

ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa.

HELD:

Yes, it is.

            The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita’s death.

Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments.

Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.

NON vs. CA

NON vs. CA

February 15, 2000

FACTS: 

            Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.

ISSUE:

            Was preterition present that would warrant annulment?

HELD:          

            When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition.

      Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence occurred.

      The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

MANINANG vs. CA

MANINANG vs. CA

June 19, 1982

FACTS: 

            Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years.  The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son.  Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

ISSUE:

            Was Bernardo preterited?

HELD: 

            In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

            Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.  Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

            By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.  Such preterition is still questionable.  The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.

MICIANO vs. BRIMO

MICIANO vs. BRIMO

50 PHIL 867

FACTS: 

A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in accordance with the Philippine law.  The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance

ISSUE:

            Will there be forfeiture?

HELD: 

Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be given effect.  A person’s will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.

            The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law.  He cannot provide otherwise.

            The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that provision is not legal.

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

4 SCRA 550

FACTS:  

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8^th clause of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.

HELD:

 The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate.  Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator.  Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition.

ACAIN vs. IAC

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987

FACTS: 

            Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio.  The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino).  In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children.  Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

            The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:

      Was there preterition?

HELD: 

            Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.      Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

            The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

            Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance.  The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.       

            The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

            In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it.  Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive.  At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.  However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA

 RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA

17 SCRA 41

FACTS:

In this case, there were 2 proceedings.  First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will.  We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other. 

ISSUE:

Which proceeding should be preferred? 

RULING: 

As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred.  The will should be probated.  The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator.  The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first.  Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind. 

If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding.  But first you go to testate. 

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

September 14, 1993

FACTS: 

The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

            Said will was admitted to probate.  Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma.  But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

ISSUE:

            Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?

HELD: 

Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills.  Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.  However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.  In this case, there was substantial compliance.  Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.

            In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.  Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA

January 31, 2005

FACTS: 

Abada executed his will in 1932.  Abada died in 1940.  It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. 

ISSUE:

            What law shall govern the validity of the will?

HELD: 

The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure.  Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code.  Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.  Abada’s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.

RABADILLA vs. CA

RABADILLA vs. CA

June 29, 2000

FACTS:        

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.  

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD: 

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82

FACTS: 

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French.  In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1^st part to the widow, and 2^nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2^nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

            The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

ALVAREZ vs. IAC

ALVAREZ vs. IAC

May 7, 1990

FACTS:        

Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.    Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After  Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots  for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE:

WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

RULING: 

The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

EMNACE vs. CA

EMNACE vs. CA

November 23, 2001

FACTS:        

Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them. 

Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership.  Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner.

HELD:

No.  The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.  Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

RIOFERIO vs. CA

RIOFERIO vs. CA

January 13, 2004

FACTS:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.

      Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.

      Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator.

HELD:          

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

 

 Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.

DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED

DELA MERCED  vs. DELA MERCED

February 25, 1999

FACTS:  

Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs.

On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.

  

ISSUE:

WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evarista’s estate.

HELD:

 No.  Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista.

VITUG vs. CA

VITUG  vs. CA

183 SCRA 755

FACTS:  

Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

ISSUES:

             WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

 WON it is valid.

RULING:

                Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property.  The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other.  Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account.