Monday, April 28, 2014

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO


VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

4 SCRA 550

FACTS:  

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.

HELD:

 The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate.  Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator.  Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition.

ACAIN vs. IAC


ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987

FACTS: 

            Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio.  The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino).  In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children.  Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

            The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:

      Was there preterition?

HELD: 

            Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.      Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

            The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

            Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance.  The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.       

            The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

            In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it.  Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive.  At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.  However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA


 RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA

17 SCRA 41

FACTS:

In this case, there were 2 proceedings.  First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will.  We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other. 

ISSUE:

Which proceeding should be preferred? 

RULING: 

As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred.  The will should be probated.  The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator.  The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first.  Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind. 

If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding.  But first you go to testate. 

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA


ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

September 14, 1993

FACTS: 

The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

            Said will was admitted to probate.  Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma.  But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

ISSUE:

            Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?

HELD: 

Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills.  Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.  However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.  In this case, there was substantial compliance.  Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.

            In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.  Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA


TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA

January 31, 2005

FACTS: 

Abada executed his will in 1932.  Abada died in 1940.  It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. 

ISSUE:

            What law shall govern the validity of the will?

HELD: 

The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure.  Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code.  Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.  Abada’s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.

RABADILLA vs. CA


RABADILLA vs. CA

June 29, 2000

FACTS:        

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.  

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD: 

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ


RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82

FACTS: 

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French.  In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

            The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.